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Expression and the Unconscious
Jasper Feyaerts* and Stijn Vanheule
Department of Psychoanalysis and Clinical Consulting, University of Ghent, Ghent, Belgium
In the present essay, we aim to develop an expressivist reading of the phenomenon
of first-person authority and the adverbial meaning of unconsciousness. In the first
part, Wittgenstein’s grammatical remarks on the asymmetry between the first -and
third-persons in psychological self-ascriptions are developed as an alternative to
detectivist explanations according to which first-person authority is to be regarded as
a matter of epistemic accomplishment. In the second part, this expressivist account
will be used to propose a non-epistemic analysis of the meaning of unconsciousness
and to offer a critical discussion of both Freud’s and Lacan’s respective readings of
the unconscious. Regarding the latter, we will reject the idea that the concept of the
unconscious (i) necessitates the introduction of a (Cartesian) “subject of the unconscious”
and (ii) could be deduced from the paradoxes of first-personal reference.
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INTRODUCTION
A recurrent effort that has spurred much discussion in post-Cartesian1 philosophy of mind has
been to defend Descartes’ basic insights on first-person authority while avoiding the tenacious
image of what Dennett derisively called the “Cartesian Theater” (Dennett, 1991). That is, most
philosophers would agree that I am often able to say what is going on “in” my mind, what I want,
believe, desire, intend and so on; whether I like to watch television, feel pain or find your joke
funny, without defending the claim that I am able to do so by some sort of mysterious process of
“inner perception” or “inner sense” involving ghostly spectators and shadowy images. A second
and closely related claim is that this presumed first-person authority is in some important sense
different from our third-person entitlements when speaking on behalf of others, or, similarly, when
speaking in such a third-personal mode on behalf of ourselves. While it is not immediately clear
whether this difference is to be cashed out in epistemic terms—i.e., the claim that self-knowledge
always surpasses the knowledge I might have of the other’s mental happenings—at least it seems
to be a common assumption that there is a basic first/third-person asymmetry in the very way
I ascribe such happenings to myself or to others which ought to be respected. Indeed, the
success and validity of philosophical theories dealing with the perennial issues of subjectivity
and first-person avowals is often measured in precisely those terms: they should (i) be able to
preserve and explain the first/third-person distinction without (ii) succumbing to the Cartesian
picture.
1To be sure, it is not so much the historical philosopher Descartes that is at stake here, but a certain general picture of the
human being that has emerged—for better or worse—from the Cartesian account, regardless of the question whether this
picture accurately reflects Descartes’s philosophy. Central to this picture are the distinction between extended bodies and
minds, issues of “privileged” access to my own mind as opposed to others’, the certainty of the first-person vs. the uncertainty
of the third-person, a theory of ideas and related spectator-conception of consciousness, and so on. For some doubts about
whether this “picture” accurately reflects Descartes’ own theory, see Eshleman (2007).
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Now there seems to be a broad family of philosophical
positions that try to accommodate these requirements by turning
to the concept of expression. Thus, for example, Wittgenstein’s
notorious “plan for the treatment of psychological concepts”
(Wittgenstein, 1981, §472) invites us to consider first-personal
avowals such as “I’m expecting an explosion” or “I’m in pain”
not as derived from the observation of expectations and pains
and their subsequent description, but as verbal expressions more
on a par with how groans and smiles would express headaches
and joys. In a similar way, Ryle claimed in The Concept of
Mind that we should see first-personal utterances not as reports
about certain frames of mind, but more as immediate disclosures
or manifestations of those frames of mind: “If the lorry-driver
asks urgently, ‘Which is the road to London?’ he discloses his
anxiety to find out, but he does not make an autobiographical
or psychological pronouncement about it” (Ryle, 2000, p. 164).
Anscombe, finally, likewise urged us not to confuse verbal
expressions of intentions with conjectural estimations of future
actions (Anscombe, 1963, p. 6)2.
This emphasis on the expressive dimension of first-personal
statements, as opposed to considering them as the linguistic
outcomes of a sort of auto-descriptive voyeuristic activity,
certainly comes a long way in meeting the philosophical
requirements we spelled out above. Both first-person authority
and the first/third person asymmetry can now be explained
by the obvious fact that I can hardly express the intentions,
wants or headaches of others (which I, nevertheless, might
observe in their expressions of them). Yet, furthermore, such
an account can also be of considerable importance in light of
some of the philosophical discussions that have traditionally
surrounded Freud’s—and in a different, though nonetheless
equally decisive way, Lacan’s—understanding and justification of
“the unconscious”3. Let us briefly note in what sense this might
be so.
One way of delineating Freud’s discovery that seems to
be beyond reasonable suspicion is that, as Laplanche and
Pontalis put it, “psychoanalytic theory emerged from a refusal to
define the psychical field in terms of consciousness” (Laplanche
and Pontalis, 1988, p. 84). Very early on some philosophers
thought this as paradoxical, but then it seemed it was above all
Freud’s recourse to the notion of “unconscious representation”
that was considered paradoxical4. “Conscious representation,”
2This idea regarding the expressive form of first-person avowals as different from
the descriptive form of third-personal attributions is of course not only retrievable
amongst ordinary language philosophers. For a similar treatment of this issue
within the phenomenological tradition, see Husserl’s section on “Expression and
Meaning” in his Logical Investigations (Husserl, 1970) (see Renaudie, 2009, for a
fine reading of this section). For a critical appraisal of the concept of “expression”
in relation to the philosophical and psychoanalytic problematic of “representation,”
see Deleuze (1990) and Deleuze and Guattari (1977).
3Most notably, David Finkelstein has presented some instructive clues as to
how a philosophical reading of first-persona authority informed by the later
Wittgenstein, can be of particular relevance for psychoanalytic conceptions of
unconscious mentality. See, in particular, Finkelstein (1999). We will return to
some of Finkelstein’s suggestions later in our article.
4Paradigmatically for this case are Brentano’s “four types of arguments” against the
possibility of an “unconscious consciousness” in his Psychology from an Empirical
Standpoint (Brentano, 2009, p. 81 et passim).
on the other hand, appeared quite natural. Yet beyond this
superficial dispute as to which psychical quality we want to
assign to these representations or Vorstellungen, the reference
to “representative ideas” or cogitationes was firmly established.
Therefore, in contrast to, for example, Lacan’s somewhat oblique
way of defining the common denominator between Freud and
Descartes in terms of a “subject of certainty” (Lacan, 1981, p.
35), there seems to be a much more straightforward reason why
indeed “the Freudian field was possible only a certain time after
the emergence of the Cartesian subject” (Lacan, 1981, p. 47).
Obviously, the gesture of defining the “psychic field” in terms
of representations, whether conscious or unconscious, and in its
wake, postulating the mechanism of inner perception as their
ever-faithful companion, present themselves as fine candidates
for explaining this historical co-emergence. For if consciousness
is conceived in terms of inner sense or self-perception, then it
isn’t too difficult to imagine the unconscious creeping in as soon
as doubts were being raised as to the scope of this mechanism of
mental illumination. As indeed Freud was about to propose in his
famous article on The Unconscious:
In psychoanalysis there is no choice for us but to assert that
mental processes are in themselves unconscious, and to liken the
perception of them by means of consciousness to the perception
of the external world by means of the sense-organs [. . . ]. Just as
Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are
subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical
with what is perceived though unknowable, so psychoanalysis
warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness
with the unconscious mental processes which are their object.
Like the physical, the psychical is not necessarily in reality what
it appears to us to be. We shall be glad to learn, however, that
the correction of internal perception will turn out not to offer
such great difficulties as the correction of external perception –
that internal objects are less unknowable than the external world
(Freud, 1915, p. 171).
Although, of course, Freud’s specific deployment of Kant as
having advanced some sort of psychologistic reading of our
faculty of knowledge is contentious, it is nevertheless clear
in what way the justification of unconscious mentality is
but a necessary consequence of this representational point of
departure. If, indeed, our consciousness of mental contents
is not merely the consequence of - as some contemporary
phenomenologists have it—their “intransitive self-givenness”5,
but rather, as Kant put it, a secondary achievement6, viz. the
outcome of a synthetic act which both attends to and abstracts
from immediate sense impressions, then the unconscious of
5For a detailed exposition of this notion and other related ones (e.g. “pre-
reflective self-consciousness,” “first-personal-givenness,” “for-me-ness,” and so on),
see Zahavi (2014).
6This idea of the necessary intervention of an active judgment in order to
explain consciousness is even more explicit in Schelling’s System of Transcendental
Idealism, in particular in the section on “How the Self intuits itself as Sensing”:
“The self senses when it finds in itself something opposed to it, namely, since the
self is mere activity, a real negation of activity, or state of being affected. But to be
that which senses, for itself, the (ideal) self must posit in itself that passivity which
till now has been present only in the real; and this can undoubtedly occur only
through activity” (Schelling, 1978, p. 61).
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such a (transcendental) consciousness lets itself be understood in
basically two ways: not only as (i.) those latent mental processes
that are unaccompanied by that act, but also (ii.) the anterior
act itself as required for consciousness, the latter due to the
fact that, as Kant put it, “I cannot know as an object that
which I must presuppose in order to know any object” (Kant,
1999, A402)7. It is then no more surprising that this structural
rencontre manquée between representational consciousness and
its fugitive condition, a condition which as condition always both
enables and hides itself in its product, was bound to serve as
the conceptual figure through which psychoanalysis would take
up its proper place as the latest and most faithful heir of the
Cartesian cogito. This explains why, for Lacan, “the subject, the
Cartesian subject” would function as “the presupposition of the
unconscious” (Lacan, 2006, p. 712). This also explains why, for
Zizek, it is only in psychoanalysis that “the forgotten obverse,
the excessive, unacknowledged kernel of the cogito” is properly
exposed (Zizek, 1999, p.2).
Yet, leaving these canonical philosophemes behind for now,
what becomes of the unconscious when the reference to
reflexive consciousness, inner sense and other related notions is
rejected? Obviously, insofar as these are rejected in serving as
a convincing account for first-person authority, so should their
inverted offspring when it comes to accounting for unconscious
phenomena. That is, if first-person authority is defined in terms
of the capacity to say something about oneself without having to
rely on conjectural inferences or observational evidence, then the
limits to this authority should not be thought in terms of the
possible failure of such third-personal procedures. Barring the
latter, what marks an intention, fear or belief as unconscious is
consequently not to be considered as something which I, qua
epistemic subject, fail to acknowledge, but rather of something
which I, qua speaker, seem unable to do.
In order to substantiate and further develop these
introductory remarks, we will proceed in the following
way: in the first part, Wittgenstein’s grammatical remarks on the
asymmetry between the first -and third-persons in psychological
self-ascriptions are presented as an alternative to detectivist
explanations according to which first-person authority is to
be regarded as a matter of epistemic accomplishment. This
expressivist account will set the stage for our second part,
where it will be used to propose a non-epistemic analysis of
the meaning of unconsciousness. Along the way, we will offer
a critical discussion of both Freud’s and Lacan’s respective
readings of the unconscious. Regarding the latter, we will reject
the idea that the concept of the unconscious (i) necessitates
7The clearest formulation of the idea that the psychoanalytic concept of the
unconscious is but the “immanent truth” of German idealism’s concept of
consciousness, can be found in Henry’s The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis: “For
the last word of the philosophy of consciousness, its limit and paradox, the
zenith at which it turns against itself and self-destructs, is truly the unconscious of
pure consciousness itself, the unconscious of “transcendental consciousness”. The
historical moment of this turning occurs when German idealism, unable to found
the principle on which it rests and eaten away from inside by this major inability,
falls into nature philosophy, which is that idealism’s truth, affirming nothing less
than the unconscious of pure consciousness itself, namely, the unconscious of
pro-duction” (Henry, 1993, p. 289). See also Redding (1999), Gardner (2012) and
Feyaerts and Vanheule (2015).
the introduction of a (Cartesian) “subject of the unconscious”
and (ii) could be deduced from the paradoxes of first-personal
reference.
EXPLAINING FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY:
FROM DETECTION TO EXPRESSION
In our introduction, we tentatively characterized the
phenomenon of first-person authority in terms of a certain
subjective privilege that seems to be attached to a range of mental
states, acts and attitudes. Now it is time to clarify what this idea
precisely entails.
Firstly, the basic intuition which is captured by such notions
as “authority” and “privilege” is that, all things being equal, I
am usually the best person to ask if you want to know what I
think, feel, intend, imagine and so on. Further classical examples
of such a privileged set of mental states are those that are
usually invoked to put an end to philosophical discussions on
skepticism. Thus, according to Descartes, I can be mistaken
whether I’m really taking a walk or writing a text, but not whether
I believe this is so, or whether it seems to me that way, or
judge it to be so. These typical cogitatio8 are all members of
a larger class which Wittgenstein designated as “psychological
verbs.” Amongst these psychological verbs, we find those which
point toward experiences (“I see,” “I hear,” “I have a headache”),
cognitive activities (“I think,” “I judge”), but also intentions (“I am
going to . . . ,” “I propose to . . . ”) or acts of the will (“I’ve decided
to,” “I want to”).
Secondly, our “subjective privilege” with regard to these
psychological verbs basically consists in being exempt from the
demands of verification or evidence that are usually attached
to our ordinary judgments, which indeed can be contested,
contradicted, denied or, at the very least, questioned as to their
justification. This is the feature Wittgenstein had in mind with
the formula “asymmetry of the first and third persons in the
present indicative.” That is, if, for example, I say I have the
beginnings of juvenile dementia, or a broken arm, then the
reasons I would cite in order justify these claims would be the
same kind of reasons as were I to say someone else had these
medical conditions. Roughly, reasons pertaining to observation,
testimony and inference. Hence, with respect to the question
of justification, in these cases there is no asymmetry between,
say, the first-personal statement “I lost my wallet” and its third-
personal inversion “he lost his wallet:” both are justified by,
for example, checking one’s pocket. However, if I say I want
to eat French fries or am contemplating Freud’s Future of an
Illusion or desiring to go on a holiday, that similarity to the
third person vanishes. Clearly, there seems to be something
strained, or perhaps even uncanny, about someone asking me to
8As noted by several commentators, Descartes uses the words “cogitation” and
“cogitare” in both an extended as well as a more restricted sense compared
to our ordinary understanding of those notions in the sense of “thinking” or
“intellectual operations.” Extended because it also comprises, for example, the
acts of imagination, sensing and willing. Restricted because Descartes retains only
those acts which are immediately and absolutely “given” to consciousness. See
Descombes (2004, pp. 176–189) and Anscombe (1981b).
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justify these claims (à la “So you believe you’re contemplating
Freud’s writings. Ok, but how do you know?”). And if I were
nonetheless tempted to respond to such queries in order to ward
of any remaining misunderstandings, citing behavioral evidence
or inferences to the best explanation to the effect that I am
really contemplating would seem to make matters worse. In
fact, as Wittgenstein points out, an important feature of the
apparently incorrigible character of self-ascriptions deploying
psychological verbs in the present indicative is that one cannot
ask the subject how he knows. By contrast, the third-personal
claim that someone else is contemplating Freud’s writings is
devoid of any such privileges and in principle susceptible to
further demands for justification.
Detectivism
So how are we to explain this remarkable capacity to talk in
such a seemingly effortless and authoritative way about our
concurrent thoughts, hopes and fears? Following Finkelstein’s
suggestion9, let us call detectivist any philosophical account that
tries to explain first-person authority by invoking a special mode
of epistemic access that allows the subject of these mental states to
know about them. That is, detectivism takes the problem of first-
person authority as actually being but one specific application
of the more general epistemological question of knowledge—
in this case “self-knowledge”—, and the problem is therefore,
as befits such epistemological queries, of determining the origin
and conditions of possibility of that knowledge. The implicit
reasoning behind such a claim seems to be the following: in
the same way as I would be unable to say of this particular
object that it is a table when I do not know what it is for
something to be a table, I would not be able to say, for example,
that I want to watch Better Call Saul if I did not know what
is for a mental state of mine to be one of wanting-to-watch
that series10. The detectivist account of first-person authority
therefore assumes a phenomenological position11 with regard to
the conditions of self-ascription of first-person avowals: in order
9See Finkelstein (2003). Finkelstein refers to Wright’s (2001) paper as the principal
source of this term.
10Here I rely on Descombes’ admirable analyses of what he calls “l’égologie
cognitive” (Descombes, 2004, pp. 146–156).
11In his recent book Self and Other (2014), Zahavi argues, contrary to our
suggestion, that a phenomenologically inspired account of consciousness and first-
person authority does not amount to detectivism. The main argument being that
from a phenomenological perspective, self-consciousness “is not brought about
by some kind of reflection or introspection or higher-order monitoring,” but is
in fact always already “an intrinsic feature of the primary experience” (p. 35).
However, I am skeptical about this argument for the following reasons: first,
“detectivism” is not primarily about what constitutes self-consciousness, that is,
it doesn’t single out a position with regard to the discussion between “one-level”
or “two-level” accounts of self-consciousness. Rather, it is a philosophical account
of what explains first-person authority, i.e., our seemingly effortless ability to say
what we think, feel or intend to do. To put it in Sartrean terms, it is an account of
connaissance de soi, rather than conscience de soi. Secondly, detectivism amounts
to the claim that first-person authority is in some, very general sense, a matter of
“finding out” what we think, hope or feel, regardless of the sort ofmechanism that is
invoked to describe this epistemic detection. In other words, if detectivism is to be
rejected, then it is not only “introspection” which serves as an exemplary culprit,
but any account that distinguishes two steps—one of knowing by detection, the
other describing what one knows—in order to explain first-person authority. And
this, I believe, is precisely the sort of account Zahavi advances when he writes about
for a first-personal psychological avowal to have any reference, it
is necessary to invoke a phenomenon of “experiential evidence”
for, or “givenness” of, my mental states, in this case, the first-
personal givenness of wanting-to-watch that series.
Now what it is that provides the subject with this evidence for
her own mental states is something about which detectivists have
held (and still hold) a variety of views.
A first traditional approach consists in postulating two acts in
order to explain a subject’s cognitive access to its mental states.
The first act being quite simply whatever mental activity happens
to occur in my consciousness, the second “reflexive” act being
whatever epistemic activity that allows the subject to come to
know about the first act by being “directed” upon or toward it.
Here we encounter some illustrious notions like “introspection,”
“inward observation,” “acquaintance,” “inner sense” or “higher
order thoughts and representations,” but the precise nature
(quasi-perceptual or representational) of these reflexive acts
should not detain us. The essential thought is that such higher-
order or two-act theories guarantee immediate knowledge of my
first-order mental acts through the recourse to a distinct—logical,
ontological, or temporal—further act, one that, moreover, can
only be directed to my own mental states, not those of others.
That is, I cannot “introspect” and hence know immediately
whether the other is in pain or intending to go for a walk, I only
have this privileged spectatorial position with regard to myself.
The objections and difficulties that such higher-order accounts
have encountered have been repeatedly discussed elsewhere,
so I will not recount them here in extenso12. Suffice for our
present purposes to refer to two of those that have figured
most prominent amongst them: on the one hand, ever since
Hobbes, Leibniz or Brentano, it has been noted that two-act
theories always lead to an infinite regress which can only be
blocked by positing anterior unconscious mental acts13. On the
other hand, the fact that self-knowledge is granted such unusual
epistemological features as immediacy, infallibility, immunity
to error through misidentification, and so on, makes it hard
to understand how any quasi-perceptual or representational
mechanism would ever be able to explain these. For it seems to
be part of our language games that talk about perception and
representation at least implies the possibility of misperception
and misrepresentation. Yet insofar as the latter are already
excluded by the very definition of the detectivist explanandum, so
should their extraordinary counterparts if we want to keep using
the transition between” pre-reflective self-consciousness” and “self-knowledge” in
terms of “reflection” (p. 36).
12See Smith (1986), Thomasson (2000, 2006), Kriegel (2003), Shoemaker (1996)
and Bar-On (2004).
13In short: if I know that I x whenever I x, it is because I x that I x whenever I x, and
so on. As Leibniz put it: “(I)t is impossible that we should always reflect explicitly
on all our thoughts; for if we did, the mind would reflect on each reflection, ad
infinitum, without ever being able to move on to a new thought” Leibniz (1981, II,
I, §19). As we have noted, this is one locus classicus to argue for the unconscious.
This idea has been most rigorously conceptualized, with some modifications, by
Lacan in his adoption of Bouasse’s ‘opticmirror device’. See his “Remarks onDaniel
Lagache’s Presentation” in Ecrits (2006, pp. 543–574). For a clear exposition of this
idea in relation to Kant’s thesis on the impossibility of an ‘intellectual intuition’ of
the “I think,” see Zupancic (1996).
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our concepts of perception and representation in any meaningful
way14.
A second approach, most commonly associated with
phenomenological writers such as Sartre or Husserl, tries to
explain the special knowledge I have of my mental acts, while
evading the regress objection, by simply stating that such
psychological verbs like thinking, perceiving or doubting are
“acts of consciousness.” In keeping with Brentano’s definition
of mental phenomena, such acts of consciousness are said to be
intentional, i.e., they are acts through which I am immediately
conscious of something; differently put, they are what allows me
to relate to a world that is transcendent to my consciousness.
Perception, for example, is that mode of consciousness through
which a perceptual object appears; imagination, that mode of
consciousness through which something is given as imagined,
thinking, that by which something is thought, . . . Therefore, on
this account, and in contrast to two-act theories, one does not
say that my intention to go on a holiday is something I perceive
or represent by way of a further act, but rather, that my intention
is a “consciousness” of a future holiday in the way of intending
it. Similarly, one does not say that my desire for a bloody mary
is something I apperceive as a disinterested spectator, but that
desire is a mode of consciousness that puts me in a relation to a
bloody mary in order for the latter to appear desirable. One has
to distinguish, as Husserl (1976, pp. 303-4) put it, the cogitatum
from its cogito, the intentional object as it is intended (im Wie
seiner Bestimmtheiten) from the intentional act through which
it is intended (im Wie seiner Gegebenheitsweisen). It is, in other
words, through the very transitive or “thetic” consciousness
of, say, a burning house as perceived or imagined, that I am
immediately alerted to the intransitive or “non-thetic” act of
perception or imagination. Importantly, it is only because the act
through which I am consciously related to objects is itself also
“experienced,” viz. that there is something “it-is-like” to perceive,
believe, think and intend, that I am subsequently able to report
on that act and its intentional object whenever I’m asked. To put
it in the typical phenomenological neologisms for denoting this
kind of intransitivity, such pre-reflexive experiences are said to
be “intrinsically self-revealing,” “self-disclosing,” “pre-reflectively
self-given,” “self-appearing” or “self-manifesting” (for these
ideas, see Henry (1973)). Coining another neologism appropriate
to our discussion, we can say that such acts of consciousness are
“self-detectifying”: that is, it is in their very nature to procure
their own evidence.
Yet, apart from the strange observation that in order to make
sense of such one-level accounts, we have to invoke what appears
14Importantly, this is also why the defense of unconscious mentality is actually
more rational and consistent within the framework of Cartesian higher-order
theories than ideas about transparency or infallibility. From the moment one
accepts two-act theories in order to explain first-person authority in a non-
metaphysical way, that is, without implicitly assigning a different meaning to
ordinary concepts like perception, belief or representation, one has to be prepared
to endorse the idea that mental phenomena are indeed, as Freud put it, not
necessarily what they appear to be (cf. supra). This would mean, for example, that I
can “misperceive” my desire as a rational belief, can “misrepresent” my groundless
anxiety as a reasonable intention, or that such mental phenomena can even go
totally “unnoticed.”
to be sui generis epistemological procedures and associated
philosophical vocabulary, it is clear that the proposal’s prima
facie plausibility derives from the decision to extend the class of
experience verbs so as to include acts like thinking, judging or
remembering. Apparently, all these different psychological verbs
now become “acts of consciousness,” and therefore, insofar as my
ability to report on them is explained by their “self-revealing”
character, must have a distinctive phenomenology about them.
Yet, believing that it is about to rain or remembering to take
out the garbage is hardly to have experienced something in the
mode of thinking or remembering, and it is highly questionable
whether there even is something like an experiential quality of
the act of intending to read the newspaper. But even in the
case of proper experience verbs like “feeling ill” or “sensing a
pain in my shoulder,” it is difficult to conceive in what way my
self-ascriptions of illness or pain could amount to any sort of
epistemic achievement. For does it make sense to say that “I
know I’m not feeling quite well today” because I have a pre-
reflexive consciousness of my current misery? Or, indeed, more
generally, to say that “I know” these troublesome sensations at
all?15 Obviously, epistemic operators like “I know that p” or
“I know whether p” only make sense if they can be used in
contrastive conjunction with their negations or modifications
like “I don’t know that p,” “I doubt whether p” or “I wonder if
p.” Whereas in the third-person case, I can indeed be ignorant or
remain in doubt about someone else’s feeling of nausea, similar
expressions in the first-person present tense like “I wonder if I
have a headache,” “I have a pain in my back, but I’m not sure,” . . . ,
are strictly speaking meaningless. Yet they are not meaningless
because, to paraphrase Sartre, we are dealing with “a cogito that
retains its rights even with psychopaths” (Sartre, 2004a, p. 148),
or with the ineliminable occurrence of a consciousness unable to
forget itself, but rather because there are no epistemic rights to
retain, nor any business of forgetting or remembering involved in
the first person present employment of such psychological verbs.
Wittgenstein’s Expressivism
Now the latter conclusion might, for some, already count as
a reductio ad absurdum of the critique of detectivism just
presented. To deny psychological self-ascriptions any epistemic
purchase seems to amount to denying the phenomenon of first-
person authority itself. That is, if it can’t be said that I know
whether I have a headache or believe that it is raining, why
then should I be credited with any kind of authority on the
matter? Additionally, anticipating our discussion of unconscious
mental states, if talk about knowledge is denied for those beliefs
and desires we are seemingly in a position to avow without any
hesitation, then it seems to be a direct consequence of such a
non-epistemic approach that talk about beliefs and desires that
do not share these first-personal asymmetries is equally ruled out
in advance.
As pointed out in our introduction, one way of addressing this
problem which arises fromWittgenstein’s later work, begins with
the suggestion that our self-ascriptions owe their status, which
15See Hacker (2005) for an extensive discussion. See also Bouveresse (1976, pp.
421–423).
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is so apparently authoritative, to the simple fact that they are
not, after all, reports of current psychological states, but rather
count as expressions of the states they only appear to describe on
a superficial consideration of their surface grammar. In the case
of sensation-language, Wittgenstein puts this point as follows:
It is not, of course, that I identify my sensation by means of
criteria; it is, rather, that I use the same expression. But it is not
as if the language-game ends with this; it begins with it.
But doesn’t it begin with the sensation – which I describe? –
Perhaps this word “describe” tricks us here. I say “I describe my
state of mind” and “I describe my room”. One needs to call to
mind the differences between the language-games (Wittgenstein,
2009, §290).
What are “the differences between the language-games” of
describing one’s room and describing one’s state of mind
Wittgenstein is hinting at in this quote? An important point
seems related to—if we can put it that way—the “temporal
logic” of the descriptive ascription. Wittgenstein appears to be
intent on denying that in the case of, for example, saying that
I am in pain, I should begin with the examination of my pain-
sensation (through, say, identifying my headache as a headache
by means of headache-criteria) before proceeding to the self-
ascription; whereas, in the case of describing my room, it is
of course indispensable that I should have observed things and
looked it over before engaging in my description. In the latter
case, the description comes at the end of the language game—
after I have identified whether the room is spacious or contains a
chaise longue. Moreover, this identification is what in fact justifies
my descriptive assertions. Yet, if Wittgenstein denies that this
is what we ordinarily do when giving one’s thought on some
philosophical matter or complaining about a pain in one’s back,
then what is it that justifies these first-personal ascriptions? And
what does it mean to say that in this kind of language game such
ascriptions come first, rather than at the end of some justificatory
activity? To continue the analogy with the room-description, one
might think, for example, that to begin with the ascription would
actually amount to describing one’s room without looking at it
first, that is to say, to simply engage in some highly speculative
endeavor. And since, in fact, Wittgenstein abrogates epistemic
justifiers in the case of psychological self-ascriptions, this seems
to leave us with the following option: to construe such talk as
being merely the result of—to use Dennett’s expression (Dennett,
1991, p. 67)—some “impromptu theorizing”. However, that this
is not the conclusion Wittgenstein wants to draw from his
critique of inner observation or any similar detectionmechanism,
becomes clear in the following passage:
“When I say ‘I am in pain’ I am at any rate justified before myself.”
– What does that mean? Does it mean: “If someone else could
know what I am calling ‘pain,’ he would admit that I was using the
word correctly”?
To use a word without a justification does not mean to use it
wrongfully (Wittgenstein, 2009, §289).
So, according toWittgenstein, it is not because I am not “justified
before myself ” in saying that I’m in pain, that I am therefore
unjustifiedwhen resorting to this pain-talk in the sense of making
a mistake or simply talking nonsense. Such a confusion will
remain as long as we do not reject “the grammar which tends
to force itself on us here” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §304), which is
precisely the descriptive grammar that is premised on the model
of “object and name” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §293) as in the case of
the description of my room. To rid oneself of the idea that, in
order to avoid skeptical worries about our “folk-psychological”
practices, authoritative psychological self-ascriptions of beliefs
and sensations must be grounded in evidence roughly in the
way that the observation of my room supports my subsequent
descriptive assertions, we have to question the assumption that
first-personal avowals function as reports about psychological
facts the speaker has previously learned or ascertained. This is
the guiding thought behind Wittgenstein’s following remarks:
The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the
idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the
same purpose: to convey thoughts – which may be about houses,
pains, good and evil, or whatever (Wittgenstein, 2009, §304).
When someone says “I hope he’ll come”, is this a report
[Bericht] about his state of mind, or a manifestation [Äußerung]
of his hope? – I may, for example, say it to myself. And surely I
am not giving myself a report (Wittgenstein, 2009, §585).
Here we retrieve the earlier suggestion that psychological
utterances are primarily manifestations or expressions of the
very states they self-ascribe, rather than secondary thoughts or
beliefs about these states uttered to inform the listener about
whatever psychological fact it was I had previously ascertained.
My utterance of “I believe (hope, desire, intend, . . . ) that p’ hence
expresses, rather than reports, my belief (hope, desire, intention,
. . . ) that p. Therefore, utterances like “I am in pain” or “that really
hurts!” are not pain-reports on a par with weather-reports, but,
like my moans or cries, manifestations of my pain; similarly, the
utterance “I want to go out” does not inform someone about
some planning experience, but voices, depending on the context
in which it is said, my desire to go out or my agreement to
your proposal; finally, ardent exclamations like “I love you” or
“I really hate your guts” do not communicate subjective facts to
which you may or may not agree or proceed to inquire some
further information, but should be more properly considered as
verbal equivalents of bringing flowers and throwing plates in your
direction.
Now, to conclude this section, what is the philosophical
import of Wittgenstein’s expressivism with regard to our
discussion of first-person authority and how precisely does it
differ from the detectivist solutions earlier discussed?
First of all, despite some other difficulties it has encountered16,
expressivism has one striking advantage when compared to other
accounts of first-person authority: the reason why, indeed, I am
usually the best person to ask if you want to know what I believe
or desire, is that, on an expressivist account, my self-ascriptions
ordinarily count as manifestations of those beliefs and desires,
16Most notably on the issue of whether or not expressive self-ascriptions can be
truth-evaluable. See Rosenthal (1993) and Wright (1998) for typical formulations
of this worry. See Alston (1967) and Finkelstein (2004, pp. 94–97) for responses.
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roughly in the same way as driving a car shows my ability to do
so, or as blushing reveals my embarrassment. This means that,
contrary to detectivist accounts, there is then no epistemological
question to be answered about how I am able to avow my
beliefs, fears and sensations, just as my “ability” to laugh with
your joke requires no preliminary introspective investigation nor
realizes any epistemic accomplishment. And since my mental
state self-ascriptions are typically not reports or descriptions of
these mental states, that is, since they do not involve subjective
judgments about the presence of these mental states, solicitations
for further proof or evidence should not be dismissed on the
grounds of being overly scrupulous superfluities, but merely
as betraying a fundamental misunderstanding of the expressive
character of my linguistic performance.
Secondly, starting from this expressivist appraisal of
psychological avowals, we can also begin to see in what way
expressivism allows for an elegant solution of the first-third
person asymmetry in mental state ascriptions that avoids some
of the pitfalls detectivist accounts have encountered. That is,
expressivism should be understood as claim about what is special
to the use of psychological self-ascriptions in contrast with a
wide array of other uses. But the contrast to be effected is not
between a first-personal intimate, direct epistemic relation, by
comparison to which third-personal inferences from behavior,
for example, are indirect and less secure; rather, the asymmetry
rests entirely on the difference between simple present tense
expressive uses and all other employments of psychological
terms. As Wittgenstein remarks in the Blue Book:
The difference between the propositions “I have pain” and “he has
pain” is not that of “L.W. has pain” and “Smith has pain”. Rather,
it corresponds to the difference between moaning and saying that
someone moans (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 68).
So what is distinctive about an avowal like “I have pain” in
contrast to its third-personal inversion “he has pain” is that in
the former case, the avowal is issued by the very person who is
said to be in pain, at the very time she is in pain, in the course of
expressing her pain. Obviously, this is something I am in a unique
position to do: only I can express or give voice to my own present
states of mind, and it is only states ofmymind that I can express.
By contrast, my ascriptions of mental states to others, e.g., saying
that someone else is in pain, will typically count as descriptions
or reports of these states of mind as expressed in their (linguistic)
behavior. In that case, my assertions can serve to express my
beliefs about whether or not “he is in pain,” but thereby I do
not, of course, express his pain, and furthermore, I ought to be
able to provide some reasons for my belief (for example, because
I saw he was in pain, or because he told me so). Furthermore,
this also explains why our first-person privilege extends only to
some aspects of our mental lives and, thus, why the asymmetry
between first -and third-person ascriptions is not reducible to
the distinction between my psychological states and those of the
other. Since first-person authority is restricted to those avowals
which express my mental states in self-ascriptions of them, past-
tense ascriptions (“I felt really sad while watching that movie”),
future-tense ascriptions (“I will feel better after going for a walk”)
or self-attributions of psychological dispositions (“I’m a hopeless
neurotic”) will fall on the third-personal side of the asymmetry
because my assertions about these matters will not express those
states themselves17.
Finally, if, as we have argued, this asymmetry is not the
consequence of any supposed epistemic asymmetry, then some
of the skeptical worries that have continued to resurface with
regard to the phenomenon of first-person privilege permit for a
different response. To take but one famous example drawn from
the philosophy of cognitive neuroscience: from the deficiency of
the Cartesian theater and its associated spectatorial accomplice in
serving as a convincing account of first-person authority, Dennett
famously argued for a view on first-personal avowals that regards
them as “theorist’s fictions” (Dennett, 1991, p. 98), that is, as
provisional beliefs about mental items whose putative reality will
be corroborated (or not) depending on future developments in
neuroscientific research. As Dennett puts it:
People undoubtedly do believe they have mental images, pain,
perceptual experience and all the rest, and these facts – the facts
about what people believe, and report when they express their
beliefs – are phenomena any scientific theory of mind must
account for (Dennett, 1991).
Here we see clearly how staunch materialists like Dennett,
despite rejecting a metaphysically suspect account of what
makes the phenomenon of first-person authority distinctive, still
retain the essential idea that sustains the detectivist picture of
psychological avowals where the latter, as we have seen, always
serve to express beliefs about mental life, rather than mental
life itself18. Yet, it is here that the explanatory fecundity of
Wittgenstein’s proposal most clearly shows itself: in the very
place where materialist detectivists locate a class of psychological
entities in order to reduce or eliminate depending on future
evidence, Wittgenstein points toward a distinctive employment
of psychological vocabulary in relation to which the usual
questions of justification and evidence quite simply do not arise.
However, in making this distinction, it is clear that Wittgenstein,
in contrast to philosophers like Dennett, does not mean to draw
our attention to any first-person epistemic short-coming, nor
means to relegate psychological avowals to the domain of fiction;
the claim is rather that our concept of knowledge (or, for that
matter, fiction) cannot handle the relation between psychological
avowals and mental life to begin with, and consequently, that
the deficiency of self-knowledge should not be invoked to raise
skeptical arguments against our ordinary practice of speaking our
minds.
17See Bar-On (2004, p. 200 et passim) for some further distinctions with regard to
the ascriptive asymmetry.
18And since first-person ascriptions are treated alike by detectivists, i.e., as (second-
order) reports or descriptions of (first-order) mental states indicated by their
psychological terms, the only point of contention between, say, materialists
and dualists, will be on the metaphysical status of these reported psychological
entities [e.g., as (ir)reducible to brain-states] and the way such reports should
be adjudicated [through, e.g., phenomenological or hetero-phenomenological
methods]. For a representative sample of such discussions, see the collection of
essays in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2007, issue 1–2).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 December 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 2162
Feyaerts and Vanheule Expression and the Unconscious
EXPRESSION AND THE “AS-IF” OF THE
UNCONSCIOUS
As suggested in our introduction, apart from its philosophical
potential to offer a non-Cartesian solution for the asymmetry
between first- and third-person psychological ascriptions,
Wittgenstein’s expressivist reading of the kind of authority
involved in first-person avowals also permits for a different take
on what is or should be one of the major preoccupations of
psychoanalytic theory: i.e. to offer a perspicuous account of
“unconscious subjectivity.”
Unconscious: Adverbial vs. Substantial
However, in setting up the problem in this way, that is, by tacitly
assuming that a philosophical reading of what it actually means
to talk about oneself in an authoritative or non-authoritative
way could have significant implications for psychoanalytic
theory, it might be objected we are already betraying one of
the fundamental tenets of the Freudian approach. And in a
certain way this is correct: what is indeed already excluded
from further consideration by taking this angle of approach
is the reference to “the unconscious” which results from the
grammatical transformation of adverbial qualifications such as
“he unconsciously believed p” or “he had the unconscious desire
to p,” into a substantive employment of the term in phrases like
“his unconscious believed p” or “this might have something to
do with my unconscious.” That is, there might be a perfectly
intelligible reason to speak of someone as, for example, harboring
an unconscious desire to please his analyst, or as manifesting
an unconscious belief in the omnipotence of thoughts, and to
say that, as Freud brilliantly put it (Freud, 1905, p. 77), even
though in such cases “his lips are silent,” he nonetheless “chatters
with his finger-tips.” And one (relatively) straightforward way
of justifying such adverbial locutions consists in bringing out
why the reference to “unconscious” matters in such descriptions,
or conversely, whether it would make a considerable difference
if the possibility of using such qualifications would henceforth
be denied (say, for example, if instead of using the term
“unconscious,” we would be obliged to resort to expressions like
“unknowingly” or “inadvertently”).
Yet, an entirely different philosophical problem seems to arise
from the moment we leave this descriptive domain of things we
might have done or believed unconsciously, and suddenly decide
to talk about beliefs, desires, processes or even “subjects” of the
unconscious. As Wittgenstein put it:
Imagine a language in which, instead of saying ‘I found nobody
in the room,’, one said ‘I found Mr. Nobody in the room’.
Imagine the philosophical problemswhich would arise out of such
a convention. Some philosophers brought up in this language
would probably feel that they didn’t like the similarity of the
expressions ‘Mr. Nobody’ and ‘Mr. Smith’ (Wittgenstein, 1969, p.
69).
And indeed, the sort of discussions that emerge from this
substantialist transformation, including the lingering conceptual
unbehagenWittgenstein was hinting at, are sufficiently familiar in
psychoanalytic circles: here, of course, we encounter the classical
and intractable debates gathered under the heading of “the reality
of the unconscious” which have animated a good deal of the
philosophical literature. Since the concept is now no longer
invoked in order to describe but to explain certain phenomena,
“the unconscious” is henceforth taken to refer to some kind of
intangible entity—depending on one’s humanistic sensitivities
and scientific aspirations, a second mind or a more impersonal
variety—able to exert a more or less causal influence on my
current behavior, secretly operating from what Freud famously
called, as a sort of backstage-addendum to the Cartesian theatre,
“der andere Schauplatz.” Closely following from this conception
are the typical queries probing its ontological credentials, i.e.
whether or not such a thing exists and if so, to put it in
Heideggerian terms, what “type of existence” or “manner of
being” we are dealing with (is it a reified thing, a slightly less
reified event, a new regulative-transcendental category, . . . ); what
kind of “stuff” it is made of (drive representatives, mnemic
traces, psychical “matter,” pure intensities?), by which kind
of laws, modes of production or mechanisms (condensation,
displacement, metaphor/metonymy, . . . ) it might be able to
produce its effects and what sort of “causality” (“psychical” or
the more progressive “structural” sort) is possibly involved here.
So, without going into much further detail, it should be clear
that insofar as this is indeed the meaning one wishes to assign
to “unconscious,” the questions that would follow from such a
substantial employment would obviously exceed the scope of our
analysis, for in that case the justification of the concept coincides,
as it should, with the (scientific) demonstration of its explanatory
potential.
However, as has been noted by numerous commentators,
there is on the other hand ample reason to resist reducing
the discussion on the logical status of the unconscious to this
substantialist locution, not merely because Freud’s arguments
for introducing such a notion are essentially vacuous, but also
because that employment has been repeatedly denounced—
most notably by Lacan—within psychoanalytic theory itself. Both
issues here—i.e., the reasons for both the explanatory vacuity
of the unconscious and Lacan’s dissatisfaction with it—can be
put in sharper focus by revisiting the well-known arguments by
which, very early on, Sartre rejected the Freudian unconscious as
a possible explanation for the phenomena of “bad faith” and self-
deception. Here’s how Sartre famously described the problem:
By the distinction between the “id” and the “ego”, Freud has cut
the psychic whole into two. I am the ego but I am not the id. I
hold no privileged relation to my unconscious psyche. [. . . ] Thus
psychoanalysis substitutes for the notion of bad faith, the idea of
a lie without a liar; it allows me to understand how it is possible
for me to be lied to without lying to myself since it places me in
the same relation to myself that the Other is in respect to me; it
replaces the duality of the deceiver and the deceived, the essential
condition of the lie, by that of the “id” and the “ego”. It introduces
into my subjectivity the deepest intersubjective structure of the
Mit-sein. Can this explanation satisfy us? (Sartre, 2003, p. 51).
And the reason why, in short, according to Sartre, the latter
rhetorical question must be answered negatively is not so much
due to, as it is often portrayed, phenomenological arguments
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invoking the insulated appeal to “lived experience,” but rather
thoroughly conceptual19. More precisely, that whenever the
psychoanalytic explanation is indeed fully and explicitly set out,
we find that the introduction of the substantial use of “the
unconscious” as something that “lies” or “deceives” in my place
merely relocates the descriptive facts of a person’s actions and
intentions at a putatively sub-personal level. It is then only
through the optical-illusory device of partitive sub-personal re-
description that the unconscious can be made to seem as a
genuine explanation; what has been offered in reality is merely
a trivial reification of the adverbial meaning of unconscious,
one which, moreover, accords quite well with the self-deceiver’s
own self-misrepresentation (see Gardner, 1993, pp. 41–58)20.
And here, furthermore, we also encounter the main source for
Lacan’s misgivings with respect to this spontaneous tendency
to “reify” or “hypostatize” the unconscious. As already evident
from Sartre’s remarks, there is indeed, apart from this conceptual
confusion, a further compelling reason why such a view cannot
be endorsed by psychoanalytic theory. For as soon as the concept
is understood in this way, a comforting picture imposes itself
where the unconscious is situated, so to speak, on the outside,
and we ourselves, as “healthy ego’s” or unsuspected spectators,
on the inside, thereby able to occupy a transcendent position
toward an unconscious which becomes nothing more than, as
Sartre put it, an “experimental idea” (Sartre, 2003, p. 51). Yet,
as Lacan argues in a Spinozistic way, the unconscious is not
what we qua conscious egos are set over and against, nor is the
Freudian Spaltung reducible to a mere shifting from one center
of (irrational) agency to another; rather, according to Lacan, this
movement of displacement or self-differing is itself precisely what
we, qua subjects, are21.
The Unconscious Structured as a Cogito
It will take us a few detours to elucidate such an elusive idea
which, as it stands, is neither of immediate relevance to our
discussion on first-person authority, nor particularly helpful in
answering the question we set out in the beginning. There
we asked quite simply what, if anything, we are trying to get
hold of by describing someone’s belief, pleasure or intention as
unconscious. And the outcome of our discussion so far has been
mainly negative: nothing in particular is gained through the shift
19This is why roughly the same line of argument can be found in Wittgenstein
who, at the very least, does not share Sartre’s phenomenological outlook: “Can we
say that we have stripped bare the essential nature of the mind? “Formation of a
concept.” Mightn’t the whole thing have been treated differently?” (Wittgenstein,
1969, p. 45).
20To quote the famous lines from Hamlet: “Was’t Hamlet wrong’d Laertes? Never
Hamlet. / If Hamlet from himself be ta’en away, / And when he’s not himself does
wrong Laertes, / Then Hamlet does it not. / Who does it then? His madness.”
21One of Lacan’s most clear expressions of this idea can be found in Seminar 2: The
Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, p. 44: “The core of our
being does not coincide with the ego. That is the point of the analytic experience,
and it is around this that our experience is organized [. . . ]. But do you think that
we should be content with that, and say—the I of the unconscious subject is not
me [moi]? That is not good enough, because nothing [. . . ] implies the inverse.
And normally you start thinking that this I is the real ego. You think that the
ego is nothing but an incomplete, erroneous form of this I. In this way, you have
accomplished the decentering essential to the Freudian discovery, but you have
immediately reduced it.”
from the adverbial to the substantive use of unconscious that
was not already left open in the former, nothing but, perhaps, a
momentary illusion of sur-plus explanatory value.
Now it is often suggested that the philosophical relevance
of a figure like Lacan stems precisely from the fact that he,
in contrast to some of Freud’s perhaps rather unfortunate
formulations, decisively “de-substantializes” the unconscious.
Although it is seldom made explicit why, in all, this is seen as a
conceptual progression in the first place—for example, because
of the absurdity of second mind-conceptions, or the daunting
prospect of having to furnish a convincing “de-homunculized”
alternative, . . . -, it is nonetheless generally agreed that Lacan’s
putative achievement more specifically consists in the very way
he proposes to de-substantialize the unconscious, that is, by
explicitly engaging with what, at first blush, seemed directly
opposed to it, namely, the modern problematic of the subject
as formulated by Descartes22. And indeed, compared to Freud’s
rather indifferent attitude toward whatever it was Descartes
hoped to establish by means of his hyperbolic diligence23, it is
certainly true that Lacan lucidly exploited the ever productive
paradoxes which result from the philosophical decision to
conceive the apparent certainty of the Cartesian cogitata as
grounded in a reflexive, transitive relation to oneself. That is
to say, precisely that sort of self-reflexive relation on account
of which Sartre believed to protect translucent consciousness
from encountering any unconscious opacity among one of its
self-negating moments, is now deployed in order to expose its
“inner limit” or “hidden truth.” In sum, instead of an unconscious
which simply reduces to an anonymous other whilst leaving the
authority of the Cartesian cogito intact, Lacan promotes the latter
figure as the most suitable persona from which the meaning
of “unconscious” could be deduced; instead of a determining
substance as opposed to a reflexive subject, Lacan proposes
a “subversive” unconscious reflexivity24, or, to condense the
foregoing permutations, a “subject of the unconscious”:
in the term subject . . . I am not designating the living substratum
needed by this phenomenon of the subject, nor any sort of
substance, nor any being possessing knowledge in his pathos, his
suffering, whether primal or secondary, nor even some incarnated
logos, but the Cartesian subject, who appears at the moment
when doubt is recognized as certainty – except that, through my
approach, the bases of this subject prove to be wider, but, at the
22To quote perhaps the most ardent defender of this view—Zizek: “Therein
resides Lacan’s achievement: the standard psychoanalytic theory conceives the
Unconscious as a psychic substance of subjectivity (the notorious hidden part of
the iceberg)—all the depth of desires, fantasies, traumas, and so on—while Lacan
de-substantializes the Unconscious (for him, the Cartesian cogito is the Freudian
subject), thereby bringing psychoanalysis to the level of modern subjectivity”
(Zizek, 2016, p. 190).
23Cf. Freud (1940a, p. 159): “There is no need to characterize what we call
“consciousness”: it is the same as the consciousness of philosophers and of
everyday opinion.”
24Again, in Zizek’s words: “[. . . ] the unconscious is not some kind of pre-reflexive,
pre-thetic, primitive substrate later elaborated upon by conscious reflexivity;
quite the contrary, what is most radically “unconscious” in a subject is his self-
consciousness itself, the way he reflexively relates to his conscious attitudes. The
Freudian subject is thus identical to the Cartesian cogito, or, more precisely, to its
later elaboration in Kantian-Hegelian self-consciousness” (Zizek, 2012, p. 554).
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same time much more amenable to the certainty that eludes it.
This is what the unconscious is (Lacan, 1981, p. 126).
Now, although it may seem that this particular psychoanalytic
version of the cogito constitutes a significant break with a long
tradition of exegetical commentary dedicated to determining
the precise meaning of Descartes’ fundamentum inconcussum, it
should be apparent however, already from this short quote, that
what we are dealing with is actually but one further variation
within that same tradition. For when understood as a cogent
response to our initial question—i.e., what does it mean for
someone’s belief (desire, intention, . . . ) to be unconscious?—,
then already one part of Lacan’s answer cannot but appear as
remarkable. That is, assuming that one horn of that question
consists in simply asking “whose unconscious belief are you
talking about?,” why is it, after all, that we are suddenly referred
to the austere figure of the “Cartesian subject”? Whence this
idea that the subject that truly matters to psychoanalysis is,
as Lacan (2006, pp. 870–872) emphasizes, not to be confused
with “the suffering subject,” “the subject in relation to his
body” or “the subject of love”? Is it, for example, somehow
an intrinsic part of psychoanalytic experience that those who
participate in that strange folie-à-deux turn out to be, on closer
inspection, “dehumanized” and “disembodied” subjects devoid
of any empirical individuality, strangely akin to those selves of
solipsism of whom Wittgenstein (2002, §5.64) aptly remarked
that, eventually, they collapse into “points without extension”?
It seems altogether more likely that we have to locate the
principal source of this idea elsewhere, and more in particular,
in those philosophical readings which, as Anscombe pointed out
in her classical article on the first person (Anscombe, 1981a),
all have tended, in their own distinctive ways, to take the “I” of
Descartes famous formula as a referring expression (Anscombe,
1981a, p. 22). In terms of our general discussion, the issue here
is closely related to the earlier discussed asymmetry between the
first and third persons with respect to psychological verbs, only
this time focused on the particular role or function fulfilled by
the word “I.” As is well known, in the Blue Book, Wittgenstein
(1969, pp. 66–67) proposes a distinction between two different
employments of the first-personal pronoun: on the one hand,
those instances where the words “I,” “me” and “mine” serve the
speaker in talking about himself as an object (e.g., his body)
and to attribute some property to this object on the basis of
an observation. Examples of this kind of use are: “My arm is
broken,” “I have grown six inches,” “The wind blows my hair
about,” . . . Since such statements are used to convey descriptive
information resulting from an observation, they are constructed
like every other assertion regarding an individual: they comprise
a predicate (whatever it was I did observe) and a subject (the
object on account of which I did the observation). Accordingly,
there are two ways in which such “I-as-object”-statements could
be susceptible to errors of identification. Be it on the side of the
predicate, because, for instance, my arm turned out not to be
broken after all; or on the side of the subject, that is, the arm
is indeed broken, but it’s not mine. The latter error is due to
the fact that I have confused one person with another, namely
myself, and its possibility indicates that what is involved in this
type of employment is the reference to and recognition of a
particular person. By contrast, the second type of employment,
where the speaker appears “as subject,” excludes any sort of error
with regard to the identity of the person involved: when I say “I
see someone approaching” or “I believe it will rain,” I might be
wrong in the sense that in fact there’s no one there or because my
forecast got it wrong, but certainly not because the one who was
seeing or believing turned out to be someone else after all. Or, as
Anscombe illustrates (Anscombe, 1981a, p. 30), when, during a
dinner, a bishop lays down his hand on the lady’s knee, he could
try to flee the embarrassing moment by claiming that he took the
lady’s knee for his own, but, in any case, not by conceding that he
mistook himself for the lady in laying down his hand.
Now this fundamental distinction with respect to the different
ways we speak about ourselves has often been translated in such a
way as to make it congenial to a traditional theory of the subject.
For it is clear that, thus presented, the opposition between these
two different kinds of employment of the first-personal pronoun
not only seems to correspond with the distinction between
physical properties (having a broken arm, measuring a certain
height, . . . ) and psychological properties (seeing, believing, . . . ),
but also between two types of “subjects” or bearers of these
properties. That is, between someone who can be identified and
referred to in a way that is symmetrical for the first and third
persons, i.e. the objective-empirical person, and someone who
can only be recognized and referred to in a special first-personal
way and who is, for that very reason, also a very special person,
i.e., a Cartesian subject or ego. This last point is particularly
important because it enables us to see not only why, as Lacan
rightly emphasizes (cf. supra), such a subject defined in terms of
an exclusive first-personal reference cannot have anything to do
with the concept of a concrete human being, but also why it is
precisely on the basis of a certain radicalization of this referential
thesis that Lacan wants to establish his idea of the unconscious
(cf. infra).
To render this conspicuous, we have to bring out why the
Cartesian self is not so much the idiosyncratic outcome of
Descartes’ purifying reductions, but rather of the philosophical
attempt to satisfy two basically incompatible conditions in
explaining the seemingly guaranteed success of the “I-as-
subject”-use. That is, the Cartesian explanation presupposes, on
the one hand, (i) that “I,” in examples of its use as subject
(e.g., “I believe it will rain,” “I doubt whether I exist,” . . . ), like
uses of other subject-terms in grammatically similar ascriptions
(e.g., “I have a bump on my forehead,” “my eyes are blue,”
“my name is René,” . . . ), purport to refer to an object of which
something is to be predicated. This in turn presupposes that
such self-ascriptions must rely on some form of access to, or
recognition of, the referent of “I.” Yet, on the other hand, (ii)
the distinctiveness of this kind of “I”-ascription relative to, for
example, the present tense use of “I-as-object,” other-ascriptions
or past-and-future tense ascriptions, is held to be a matter of
epistemic security: unlike these other referring expressions, the
use of “I” as subject is immune to error throughmisidentification,
which is to say that in this case its referential success is thought
to be guaranteed. However, from the effort to combine these two
conditions, i.e., semantic continuity and epistemic asymmetry,
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in explaining what is specific to the employment of the “I-as-
subject,” it necessarily follows (iii) that the subject who is referred
to in such ascriptions cannot be individuated or identified on the
basis of any identity criteria, since, as a matter of conceptual or
logical necessity, talk about reference and identification implies
the possibility of their failure or misapplication. Hence the idea,
pointed out by Lacan and several other Descartes interpreters,
that the ego which gloriously survives the increasingly stringent
stages in the skeptical cogito-procedure, has nothing in common
whatsoever with the historical-empirical figure of Descartes, nor
with any conceivable personal identity: such an ego is said to
be “purified” from all possible determinations, like Pascal’s “ego
without qualities,” Kant’s formal “I-think” orHusserl’s “reine Ich.”
Yet, leaving the philosophical genealogy of the cogito aside
for a moment, this also means that the prospect of getting a
satisfactory answer to our initial question suddenly appears to
be rather dim. Since if that answer, at least for the part that
interest us here, consists in claiming that the subject we are
dealing with is an existence without determination, an empty
form deprived of all substance and content, in short: a thinking
or doubting in general, then it is not only that subject which
appears as “void,” but, it seems, so does our whole questioning.
For imagine, for example, what such an answer would amount
to for a psychoanalyst who wants to distinguish between two
of his patients, or perhaps between himself and his patient,
while being forced to proceed on the basis of the Cartesian
clue “a thinker or thinking in general.” It is clear that even a
simple task like this would quickly reveal itself as being utterly
hopeless. Whatever other theoretical need it is supposed to fulfill,
the referential description “a subject in general” is of course
completely useless in distinguishing one subject from another, for
all identity criteria which would allow us to answer that question
have been expelled, but the theoretician of the subject, whether
he wants it to be conscious or unconscious, has failed to give
us a proper alternative. Being a “subject in general,” therefore, is
perhaps to be a subject in a contrived philosophical sense, but
not the analyst, not the patient, nor anyone else. As Descombes
put it (Descombes, 2014, p. 68, our translation), it is rather like
having an “address in general,” that is to say, of living somewhere,
but nowhere in particular. And it should be clear that this is
not an “ontological” invitation to henceforth distinguish between
two types of addresses, those that are particular and those that
are general, but rather to question how we ended up with such
non-localizable entities in the first place.
The Cogito Structured as An Unconscious
Already one part of that answer we tried to elucidate above: in
trying to account for the difference between the first and third-
person uses of the first-personal pronoun, the Cartesian subject
emerged as a sort of unstable “compromise formation” resulting
from the attempt to straddle both sides of the following fence at
once. On the one hand, aiming to preserve semantic continuity,
the expression “I,” like all others referential expressions, is
considered to be the term through which a speaker or thinker
refers to himself. Yet, on the other hand, aiming to preserve
epistemic asymmetry, such reference cannot have any of the
ordinary features normally attached to this kind of operation:
as Anscombe remarks, “I” is supposed to have “sure-fire”-
reference (Anscombe, 1981a, p. 30), a remarkable quality which
in turn seems to contradict its professed semantical function.
Furthermore, unwilling to confront this precarious dilemma in
which epistemic asymmetry undermines referential symmetry
and vice versa, the Cartesian is moved to advance an extra-
ordinary referent corresponding to his idea of extra-ordinary
reference: this is the Cartesian subject or ego.
We pointed out how this referential interpretation of the
“I” seems to saddle us with a mysterious entity which, despite
remaining certain in its doubtfulness, is nonetheless entirely
useless when it comes to answering even the most basic identity
questions. So, in so far as the issue here does not merely pertain
to the particularities of the alleged outcome of Descartes’ Second
Meditation, but, as Lacan suggests, equally concerns the everyday
practice of psychoanalysis, then at least one clear undesirable
consequence of embracing this figure as the principal term of
reference in psychoanalytic theory is that the dialogical situation
between an analyst and his patient would inevitably collapse into
an unmanageable state of identity confusion.
Be that as it may, this still leaves us with the task of unravelling
in what sense Lacan’s peculiar deduction of the meaning of
‘unconscious’ from the formula of the Cartesian cogito is to be
understood. For it is clear, of course, that Lacan is not in the
Cartesian business of proving he has a soul, nor intent on shoring
up any indubitable entity that could come to function as an
initial bedrock for subsequent world-involving epistemological
deliberations. The intention here is rather to denounce what
he holds to be the “initial error of philosophy” (Lacan, 1987,
p. 107)25, which, moreover, apparently consists in the ever-
renewed attempt to reduce the difference between “subject and
consciousness” (Lacan, 1987, p. 106):
At a crucial point of the Cartesian askesis, [. . . ] consciousness
and subject coincide. It is holding that privileged moment as
exhaustive of the subject which is misleading—making of it the
pure category that the presence of a gaze (as amode of opaqueness
within the visible) would come to make flesh with its vision [. . . ].
It is, on the contrary, at that moment of coincidence itself, in so far
as it is grasped by reflection, that I intend to mark the site through
which psychoanalytic experience makes its entrance. At simply
being sustained within time, the subject of the “I think” reveals
what it is: the being of a fall. I am that which thinks “Therefore
I am” [. . . ] noting that the “therefore,” the causal stroke, divides
inaugurally the “I am” of existence from the “I am” of meaning
(Lacan, 1987, pp. 106–107).
Yet, here already, and despite the air of radical “subversion”
which is supposed to transpire throughout these lines, it is
remarkable that Lacan actually shares the detectivist gesture
25See also Miller’s diagnosis of this same “error”: “What is serious for Lacan is
the logic of the signifier, that is to say the opposite of philosophy, inasmuch as
every philosophy rests on the appropriateness, transparency, agreement, harmony
of thought with itself. There is always some part hidden, in a philosophy, an I
= I, which constitutes what Lacan called at some moment “the initial error in
philosophy” which consists in privileging this equality and thusmaking one believe
that the “I” is contemporary with itself, while its constitution is always after the
emergence of its cause, of petit a” (Miller, 2006, pp. 22–23).
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of invoking “consciousness” as a special medium of epistemic
access (“the presence of a gaze,” “grasped by reflection,” . . . ) in
explaining what allows Descartes, or any other person for that
matter, to declare that “I think (‘therefore I am’)”. Secondly,
we also encounter the referentialist framework within which
such detectivist ideas are able to flourish: saying that “I think
(‘therefore I am’)” is, on that account, to be considered as a
linguistic act through which I refer to, and identify with, a person
(i.e., “myself,” or, to keep with Lacan’s third-personal inversion
“my self ”) under a particular description26, in this case “I am that
which thinks ‘therefore I am’.” So, revealingly, it is in any case not
this traditional account of first-personal reference whichmight be
critically questioned and identified as philosophy’s “initial error,”
but rather that of holding this detectivist moment as “exhaustive
of the subject” (Lacan, 1987, p. 106). Or, differently put, not the
idea that I, in speaking about myself—whether this means saying
things like “I think I exist,” or less dramatically, “I’m not feeling
too well,” “I believe it will rain,” . . .—have to engage in a sort of
mysterious auto-reflexive procedure at the end of which, on the
one hand, the term “I” serves to designate or name the person
who is currently speaking27, and its verbal complements (“not
feeling too well,” “believing it will rain”), on the other hand,
function as descriptive predicates filling out the first-personal
proposition, but the idea that this procedure is actually able to
attain its self-reflexive intention.
And indeed, doubts as regards the feasibility of this kind of
auto-referential operation are easily generated on account of a
famous paradox to which such views unavoidably lead. For if
speaking about myself in the first-person is represented as yet
another version of third-personal reference, that is, if, in saying
“I know I exist” or “I believe it will rain,” I refer to myself as
someone who knows or believes thus, to who then exactly does
this reference apply? The subject, for example, who, in turning
his attention to himself, knows that he believes he exists, does
he also believe he exists? Or, to take a more clinically relevant
example, the patient who, during his weekly session with the
analyst, suddenly avows his intention to change his life, does
he also want to change his life? Moreover, given this idea of
first-personal reference, could he even be imagined as ever being
able to answer that question? Obviously not, for if we are to
follow Lacan’s reconstruction of the cogito, such a patient is
forever condemned to occupy a spectral position of perpetual
self-commentary with regard to himself, hence always missing
26See also Lacan’s seminar on Identification where this idea is rendered even more
explicit: “Therefore—as we have said—this sentence of: “I think” has the interest
of showing us—it is the least we can deduce from it—the voluntary dimension of
judgment” (Lacan, unpublished, p. 9, our italics). Elsewhere in the same seminar,
Lacan coins the neologistic pun “mihilisme” to qualify this operation: “Thus, we
see here, in short in our tongue, a sort of identification through the operation of a
special significant tendency, that you will allow me to qualify as “mihilisme” in so
far as to this act, this experience of the ego is referred” (Lacan, unpublished, p. 4).
27See also Lacan’s “linguistic definition of I as signifier”: “In a concern for method,
we can try to begin here with strictly linguistic definition of I as signifier, where it is
nothing but the shifter or indicative that, qua grammatical subject of the statement,
designates the subject insofar as he is currently speaking” (Lacan, 2006, p. 677, our
italics).
out on his true position as commentator28. And the reason for
this is clear: the effort to align the use of the first-person with
the third-person has, as its ultimate consequence, the effect of
installing a “division” of the subject, separating the one “who is
speaking” from the one “who is spoken of.” Or more precisely:
on such an account, when “I” speak about “myself,” the “I” and
the “self ” do not share the same reference (see also Silveira-Sales,
2007). And here, finally, we also encounter that “self-differing”
movement (cf. infra) which, according to Lacan, fundamentally
characterizes our position as speaking subjects: wanting to speak
about myself in the first-person, and believing to express myself
in the first-person present tense, I am irrevocably condemned to
speak about myself in a third-personal way, that is, of referring
to a “self ” or “ego” from which, by the simple fact of this act of
self-reference, I am immediately detached qua speaking subject.
Putting this all together, Lacan asks:
Is the place that I occupy as subject of the signifier concentric or
eccentric in relation the place I occupy as subject of the signified?
That is the question. The point is not to know whether I speak of
myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but rather to know
whether, when I speak of myself, I am the same as the self of whom
I speak (Lacan, 2006, p. 430).
Yet, despite the structuralist tropes invoked in dressing up this
question, this is merely to offer a more convoluted version of
the optical metaphor which sustains the detectivist idea of the
unconscious: in the same way as the “eye,” in relation to its
visual field, “sees everything except itself ” (i.e. Lacan’s “as a
mode of opaqueness within the visible”); or, in the same way
as the “I think,” in order to be able to accompany all my
representations, cannot accompany its own act of representation,
etc., the speaking subject can only refer to itself on the condition
of remaining oblivious to its own position of enunciation29. The
detectivist unconscious and the paradoxes generated by the idea
of first-personal reference are then but two sides of the same
coin: wherever self-knowledge is supposed in order to explain
referential success, unconscious ignorance comes to haunt this
very act of self-reference.
CONCLUSION
The latter conclusion might be alarming for anyone who takes it
upon himself to secure his existence by means of the Cartesian
28As indeed was already the conclusion drawn by that other eminent philosopher
of reflexive paradoxes, i.e., Sartre: “Thus the consciousness that says ‘I think’
is precisely not the consciousness which thinks. Or, rather, it is not its own
thought which it posits by this thetic act” (Sartre, 2004b, p. 6). The only difference
separating Lacan from Sartre with regard to this issue of first-personal reference
is therefore related to a disagreement concerning the concept of “pre-reflexive
consciousness”. Cf. supra.
29As Lacan puts it: “Is this not designed to make us question ourselves about what
is at stake at this radical, archaic point that we must necessarily suppose to be at
the origin of the unconscious, namely of this thing through which, in so far as the
subject speaks, all he can do is to advance further along the chain, in the unfolding
of enunciations, but that, directing himself toward the enunciations, by this very
fact in the enunciating, he elides something which is properlywhat he cannot know,
namely the name of what he is qua enunciating subject” (Lacan, unpublished, p. 62,
our italics).
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askesis, but for our present purposes, this also means that the
account of the unconscious we get from Lacan’s restatement of
the cogito in terms of the enchanting formula “I am thinking
where I am not, therefore I am where I am not thinking” (Lacan,
2006, p. 340) is, in the end, clearly parasitic on the detectivist
picture of first-person authority. That is to say, it is indeed
a correction within that picture, but not a correction of that
picture. For it is not a matter of dispute that I can think and
talk about myself and that the use of the first-person is the most
ordinary way to do so. Whether I say I have the intention to
go on a holiday or desire to finish this article, I indeed talk
about myself, about my future intentions and current wishes.
Nothing in particular has been decided by putting the issue in
this way, because no philosophical account of this ability has
been advanced either. However, does this necessarily mean, as
Lacan seems to suggest, that in order to talk about myself, I
have to refer to myself? Is speaking or thinking in the first-
person to be considered as a referential activity in which I have
to identify myself with myself and in which the “I” comes to
function as a proper name and its psychological complements as
descriptive predicates? Or, to put this in terms of Lacan’s quarrel
with the philosophies of consciousness: where in fact do we have
to situate the “initial error of philosophy”? In the discussion
about whether or not first-personal reference can ever attain
that mythical moment of self-coincidence, or, indeed already, as
Wittgenstein suggests, in the very idea of self-reference?
To clarify this issue, let us consider the following two
sentences:
• It will rain
• I believe it will rain
The relevant question here is whether there is any difference
with regard to the object of these two assertions. At a first
impression, and because of the difference in their grammatical
form, the two sentences at least seem to be different: the first
one talking about the weather, the second one, on the other
hand, containing a psychological proposition specifying my
belief. However, according to Wittgenstein, by themselves, that
is, without considering the context of use of these sentences,
these grammatical appearances prove nothing. Yet, let us first
develop Lacan’s suggestion that sentences of the second form
are referential descriptions which predicate something about an
“ego” of which it is said that it “believes it will rain.” Here, it is
strictly irrelevant whether this also means “alienating” oneself in
language, the signifier, the mirror image or any other estranging
medium held responsible for generating that unpalatable pathos
so typical of Lacanian thinking; the same conclusion will hold
for the Cartesian who does believe in the contemporaneity of
“subject and consciousness.” Suppose, furthermore, that we have
two people, the one affirming “I believe it will rain,” the other
maintaining “No, I don’t think so.” If we are to follow Lacan’s
account, these two speakers do not, and obviously even cannot,
speak about the same thing: although, as we have seen, their true
positions as speakers might remain unconscious, both can only
refer to themselves, to the beliefs they report in describing them.
But this is also to say, on the one hand, that the possibility of
two speakers ever contradicting each other has been left behind,
and indeed, as is now apparent, that the threat of solipsism has
become unavoidable.
Assuming that even for the psychoanalyst dealing with psychic
reality, the latter consequence is too high a price to pay, we have
to reject the picture which seems to hold us captive here, which
is in this case the assumption of semantical continuity across the
first—and third-person uses of the psychological verb “believe.”
That is, it is only because the sentence “I believe it will rain” is
analyzed as amore private version of “He believes it will rain” that
we seem to get into this philosophical mess of which, as we have
tried to show, both unidentifiable subjects and communicative
solipsism are the undesirable outcomes. Therefore, rejecting
semantical continuity means recognizing that, grammatical
appearances notwithstanding, the verb “believe” does not signify
the same thing in the first- and third-person versions of
“believing it will rain.” In the first-person present tense, “I
believe” indeed expresses a belief, but this is not a belief referring
to myself, nor to some meteorological belief-state, but quite
evidently, a belief about the weather. But this also means, first
of all, that, in contrast to the obvious difference between the
sentences “He believes it will rain” and “It will rain,” sentences
(i) and (ii) above are, from the perspective of their use and hence
of their meaning, perfectly identical: the prefix “I believe” adds
nothing to the meaning already found in “It will rain,” which is to
say that it is entirely redundant. Yet, secondly, as per the Lacanian
idea of the unconscious, this means that the subversive effort to
lodge a moment of opacity within the temporal movement of
self-reference is equally bound to failure: not because in saying
“I believe it will rain” I am somehow magically protected from
errors through misidentification, but simply because in this case
there is no self-reference and hence no “identification” involved
in the first place 30.
Yet, does this observation imply that the effort to offer
a philosophical clarification of the adverbial meaning of
unconscious should now be abandoned? It seems, on the
contrary, that the only thing we have effectively abandoned is
a distorted view on the first-person and, by implication, on the
meaning of unconsciousness, which keeps producing nothing
but conceptual incongruities. Recognizing what distinguishes
speaking about oneself in the first person present indicative from
third-personal reference is, first of all, to reject the detectivist
picture of the unconscious in all its different guises, whether this
means the deficiency of inner sense as in the earlier quote by
Freud, or its more elaborate Lacanian version in terms of the
paradoxes of self-reflection and first-personal reference. Speaking
about someone else, I indeed refer to and identify someone by
predicating something about his intentions and beliefs; but in
my own case, none of these epistemic procedures are involved,
and so the idea of the unconscious as involving beliefs, intentions
or Cartesian subjects which would escape epistemic self-scrutiny
cannot be involved either. However, dissociating the adverbial
qualification of unconscious from failures of self-knowledge in
30Anscombe sums up this point as follows: “Getting hold of the wrong object
is excluded, and that makes us think that getting hold of the right object is
guaranteed. But the reason is that there is no getting hold of an object at all”
(Anscombe, 1981a, p. 32).
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this way, also means to bring out the truth of Freud’s following
incisive observation:
From what I have so far said a neurosis would seem to be the
result of a kind of ignorance – a not knowing about mental
events that one ought to know of. [. . . ] Now it would as a
rule be very easy for a doctor experienced in analysis to guess
what mental impulses had remained unconscious in a particular
patient. So it ought not to be very difficult, either, for him to
restore the patient by communicating his knowledge to him and
so remedying his ignorance. [. . . ] If only that was how things
happened! We came upon discoveries in this connection for
which we were at first unprepared. Knowledge is not always
the same as knowledge: there are different sorts of knowledge,
which are far from equivalent psychologically. [. . . ] If the doctor
transfers his knowledge to the patient as a piece of information,
it has no result. [. . . ] The patient knows after this what he did
not know before – the sense of his symptom; yet he knows it
just as little as he did. Thus we learn that there is more than
one kind of ignorance. We shall need to have a somewhat deeper
understanding of psychology to show us in what these differences
consist (Freud, 1966, pp. 280–281).
So, if, as well-attested by Freud, what it is for a desire or belief
of mine to be unconscious is not primarily a matter of any
straightforward first-personal epistemic shortcoming; moreover,
if, on the contrary, knowledge as to my present unconscious
inclinations seems perfectly compatible with the very existence
of such inclinations, then what is the qualification “unconscious”
a qualification of ? Or, as we put it earlier on in this paper,
what exactly would be lost from our descriptive psychological
repertoire if we opted to replace the term “unconsciously” by the
more innocuous “unknowingly”? Would we effectively miss out
on certain kinds of human behavior if our conceptual vocabulary
was to be impoverished in this way?
We will conclude our article by arguing that this is
indeed the case and that such examples can serve as
an important step toward clarifying the adverbial meaning
of unconsciousness. Here, both the subtle analyses of the
phenomenon of “belief disavowal” by the French psychoanalyst
Mannoni31 and Wittgenstein’s grammatical remarks on the
concept of unconscious32 can provide some decisive suggestions.
To begin with the former: by means of the formula “I know
quite well, but still . . . ,” Mannoni aimed to capture a number
of paradoxical, though seemingly entirely common situations
in which someone appears to simultaneously entertain two
contradictory beliefs. As, for example, the enlightened reader of
horoscopes who “knows quite well” that cosmological predictions
of future life events are sheer nonsense, yet still seems to take
a strange pleasure in reading them anyway. In his own case,
31For Mannoni’s theory of disavowal, see his two essays “Je sais bien, mais
quand même . . . ” and “L’illusion comique” in Mannoni (1985). For an English
translation of the first essay, see Mannoni (2003, pp. 68–92). An important and
lucid elaboration of Mannoni’s account can be found in Pfaller (2014).
32For some of Wittgenstein’s scattered remarks on a possible grammatical use of
unconscious in relation toMoore’s paradox, seeWittgenstein (1988, pp. 65–67). See
also Descombes’ brilliant discussion of this connection to which we are indebted
for this point, in Descombes (2002).
Mannoni observed that when the horoscope predicted that a
certain day on which he had planned a move was indeed
“particularly favorable for changes at home” (Mannoni, 1985,
p. 20), he fell into strange fit of laughter. Yet, he also admits
that his laugh would have been different if the horoscope had
strongly advised against such domestic intentions. Or, in a similar
example provided by Pfaller (2014, p.1), imagine that, while
reading a newspaper, a friend arrives and says: “Excuse me, can
I have a quick look at your newspaper? I know it’s silly, but I
just have to know the score from yesterday’s game.” So, with
regard to our present discussion, what needs to be highlighted
in these examples is the paradoxical relation a subject seems
to entertain with its beliefs (i.e., the importance of sports; the
significance of horoscope predictions). In a way that is difficult to
render conceptually transparent, these sorts of beliefs are never
really believed in (“I know it’s silly”; “I know these coincidences
are meaningless”), yet in one way or another, they nonetheless
exert a particular influence on their subjects (the compulsion to
look at the paper—the pleasurable laughter). Moreover, as Pfaller
argues (Pfaller, 2014), it is not so much their (trivial) content
that is primarily of interest here, but rather the form in which
people seem to refer to these beliefs. That is, as was already
apparent from Mannoni’s formula for this type of situations, its
form is characterized by a rather unsettling coexistence of “better
knowledge” and “belief.” The fidget sports fanatic knows quite
well that yesterday’s results are not important, but still he has to
see them. Despite the better knowledge, and despite the ironical
distance between him and his silly practice, he nevertheless acts
as if sports are of utmost importance.
Importantly, in his own way, Wittgenstein seems to have
seized on precisely these sorts of situations in order to justify
a possible use of the adverb “unconsciously.” Starting from the
observation that, as we have argued, in the first-person present
indicative, the verb “believe” behaves in a different way compared
to its third-personal form, Wittgenstein however also envisaged
whether it would be possible to construct an intelligible use of “I
believe” which would be symmetrical to the third-personal “He
believes.” In order to create such a form, Wittgenstein proposes
that we could modify the verb “believe” in the first person by
adopting the expression “I seem to believe” or “going by my
behavior, this is what I believe”:
My attitude to my own words is wholly different from that of
others. I could find that variant conjugation of the verb, if only
I could say “I seem to believe”. If I listened to the words issuing
from my mouth, then I could say that someone else was speaking
out of it. “Judging from my words, this is what I believe”. Now, it
would be possible to think up circumstances in which this made
sense (Wittgenstein, 2009, II§103-105).
And the sort of circumstances Wittgenstein deems relevant here
are exactly those in which it would make reasonable sense to talk
about “unconscious beliefs” or “unconscious intentions.” That
is, “I seem to believe” is the expression I could use whenever,
like in the situations described by Mannoni, I have to conclude,
rather to my own surprise and despite better judgment, that I
seem to behave as someone who believes this or that. Hence,
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what the qualification “unconscious” aims to capture in such
instances is, on the one hand, the fact that we come to learn
about these beliefs or desires in the same way as we would
proceed in the case of others, that is, by observing and reporting
on what is revealed to me in my own behavior and immediate
reactions. Here, therefore, and in contrast to the use of the first
person in the present indicative, it doesmake perfect sense to say
that I “identify” myself as someone who unconsciously believes
or desires certain things, for it is part of the very meaning of
unconsciousness that I have to be informed about my beliefs
and desires in such an alienated, third-personal way33. Yet, on
the other hand, this also means, vindicating Freud’s observation,
that the idea of unconsciousness which is at stake here is in an
important sense non-epistemic. On the contrary, since we have
shifted to a symmetrical employment of psychological verbs, talk
about my unconscious beliefs is precisely talk about what I, in
principle, might come to know about myself through an attentive
examination of my own expressive behavior or through the
suggestions provided by the analyst. Nevertheless, as Freud had to
acknowledge, acquiring such knowledge seems to be of little avail
with regard to the efficacy of the beliefs in question. So, applied
to Mannoni’s idiom, what seems to single out those unconscious
beliefs which would complement the expression “I know quite
well, but still . . . ” from those beliefs which, for example, are
already expressed in the self-ascription “I know quite well,”
33And not, contra Lacan, the other way around: i.e., because I always have
to identify myself in one way or another, I necessarily misidentify myself qua
unconscious subject.
cannot be related to a lack of detectivist introspection, nor to
any paradox of self-reflection, but rather, as we suggested in our
introduction, to something I seem unable to do. More precisely,
although I do express these beliefs and desires in my actions,
for example, in the urge to read the newspaper, or in the fading
smile while reading disappointing cosmological prospects, what
makes them specifically unconscious seems related to the fact that
I am unable to express those beliefs and desires in a particular
way, that is, as Finkelstein points out (Finkelstein, 1999, 2003), in
expressive self-ascriptions while using the first person present34.
Although I can describe my unconscious mental states through
the use of symptomatic expressions like “I know, but still . . . ”,
I am unable to talk out about them in linguistic acts of self-
expression, that is, by expressing my unconscious belief in simply
saying “I believe.” In sum: on the expressivist view we have
discussed here, an unconscious state of mind is not primarily
a matter of something which I, qua epistemic subject, fail to
acknowledge, but rather of a specific expressive position which
I, as speaker, cannot occupy35.
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